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More than one third of college-educated workers have a license that provides the 
right to practice a particular occupation. In contrast to certificates, these licenses—
serving either as a productivity signal or acting as a restrictive practice—are associated 
with significantly higher earnings. Thus, it is possible that some part of the returns to 
college are in fact returns to licensing. Here we identify the effects of licenses on a set of 
labor market outcomes for the college-educated workforce. We use newly available 
national Current Population Survey data merged with U.S. Department of Labor state-
level occupation-specific licensing requirements. We find significant discrepancies 
between individual self-reported licensing rates and state-mandated licensing 
requirements across occupations. We find significant advantages from licensing in terms 
of earnings and labor market participation (hours worked). Moreover, controlling for 
licensing does not significantly reduce the measured returns to college. Licenses convey 
economic benefits even in occupations where they are not required. In contrast to prior 
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Occupational licensing—the procurement of a license issued by a state or other 
government agency that provides a right to practice in a particular occupation—is 
increasingly required for many U.S. jobs: approximately one quarter of workers claim 
that a license is required to do their job (Cronen, McQuiggan, & Isenberg, 2017; 
Department of the Treasury Office of Economic Policy, the Council of Economic 
Advisers, and the Department of Labor [DTOEP, CEA, DOL], 2015; Kleiner & Krueger, 
2013). In a series of studies, licensing has been found to increase workers’ earnings, often 
by a substantial amount (Gittleman & Kleiner, 2016; Kleiner & Vorotnikov, 2017). This 
consistent and strong licensing premium has been attributed to restrictive practices and 
barriers to occupational entry and mobility (Carpenter, Knepper, Erickson, & Ross, 
2012). According to this view, by restricting the supply of workers with the right to 
practice an occupation, the licensing regulation drives up earnings. With licensing 
becoming more common, alongside anecdotal claims of spurious regulations in 
ostensibly low-skill occupations, licensing boards are increasingly under scrutiny to 
justify their licensing requirements for each occupation (Kleiner, 2015; Thornton & 
Timmins, 2015). 
Given its growing prevalence, the economics of licensing merits further 
investigation. First, most research has examined wage premiums for licensing. But such 
premiums—clearly predicted from a basic labor market model with supply constraints—
are not the only potential impact of licensing. Instead, a critical issue is whether 
licensing—by signaling the quality of the service being provided—increases its demand 
and thereby serves to increase employment. If employment goes up, licensing resolves an 
important market failure by signaling worker (and thereby product) quality and by 
guaranteeing a threshold level of service for consumers (DTOEP, CEA, DOL, 2015). 
Second, limited evidence is available on the interaction between the returns to licensing 
and the returns to postsecondary education. This absence is particularly notable for 
community college graduates who have the highest rate of licensing and typically lack 
professional qualifications that are more common among four-year degree graduates 
(such as law or medical degrees). Although many studies find significant wage returns to 
completing community college, these returns might be partially or even wholly 
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attributable to omitted variable bias from having a license. Finally, there is increasing 
variety in how workers can signal their skills. Postsecondary certificates have become 
more important, along with industry certifications; some of these credentials may be 
stacked together or with degrees (Bailey & Belfield, 2017a). Workers may prefer these 
credentials in lieu of a license, although these alternatives might not be as beneficial as a 
license for the individual worker. If workers are accumulating different awards for work 
within a given occupation, this may lead to greater variation in earnings. 
Here, we investigate each of these research issues using newly available national 
data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population 
Survey. As a precursor to analyzing labor market impacts, we examine the patterns of 
licensing across the U.S. workforce and especially the association between postsecondary 
awards and licensing. For our labor market analysis, we focus on college-educated 
workers and in particular on community college graduates: as well as being licensed at 
the highest rates, the vocational focus of community college may mean that this group is 
the most influenced by licensing practices. We begin our analysis by reestablishing 
earnings premiums from licensing and by comparing these premiums with the returns to 
associate degrees. Next, we consider the employment effects of licensing to see if 
licensing solves a form of market failure or serves as a restrictive practice. Finally, we 
examine wage dispersion across licensed and unlicensed workers. 
 
2. How Licensing Affects Labor Market Outcomes 
A license conveys a legal right to practice an occupation. To obtain a license, 
workers must meet a set of prescribed standards, such as having a college degree, 
completing a vocational/training course, and/or passing an exam.1  
Until recently, national data on licensing has not been available. Research 
analysis has relied on bespoke or small-scale surveys or occupation-specific datasets.2 
                                                 
1 In contrast, industry certification is awarded by any organization, is not legally required for work, and 
often only requires some demonstration of competency (but a license may require a certification). 
2 Kleiner and Krueger (2013) use a Westat survey. Gittleman and Kleiner (2015) use the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). Gittleman, Klee, and Kleiner (2015) use the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP), which does not clearly distinguish certificates from licenses. Kleiner and 
3 
 
These studies typically report licensing rates of 10–30 percent with an average estimate 
around one quarter (Kleiner & Krueger, 2013; Gittleman & Kleiner, 2015; Kleiner & 
Vorotnikov, 2017). However, as well as the data used in this study, new descriptive 
evidence is forthcoming from the Adult Training and Education Survey (ATES) 
component of 2016 National Household Education Survey (NHES). In their summary of 
ATES across all workers, Cronen, McQuiggan, and Isenberg (2017) report that only 18 
percent are licensed (with 6 percent of the total having certification and 8 percent having 
a postsecondary certificate).3 Rates of licensing vary significantly by occupation, with the 
highest rates being in health-related occupations and industries (Kleiner & Krueger, 
2013). Also, licensing rates vary considerably across states, depending on the policies of 
each state’s regulatory boards or commissions. Interestingly, these state-specific 
differences do not appear to be attributable to occupational differences (Kleiner & 
Vorotnikov, 2017). 
Critically, a license is intended to regulate entry into a profession—unlike 
certification or a college degree. Potentially, there are several justifications for this 
restriction serving as a public good (DTOEP, CEA, DOL, 2015). With better qualified 
workers, licenses may be associated with improved product or service quality. With 
better trained workers, health and safety in the workplace may be increased. With 
minimum standards, licenses may protect consumers from incompetent practitioners. 
With standardized product/service quality, licenses may reduce within-occupation wage 
inequality. Overall, however, the justification for licensing is that it should increase the 
confidence that consumers have in the quality of the good or service when it is provided 
by licensed workers. The increased consumer confidence should increase the demand for 
the end product. Licensed workers should therefore earn more and have higher rates of 
employment. The contrary position is that licensing is a restrictive practice that restricts 
entry into and therefore employment in an occupation (Kleiner, 2006). This restriction 
has several effects: it increases wages for licensed workers; increases end-product prices 
(controlling for quality); reduces worker mobility; and, by standardizing work practices, 
                                                 
Vorotnikov (2017) use a Harris survey. Important occupation-specific studies are Federman, Harrington, 
and Krynski (2006) and Timmins and Thornton (2013, 2015). 
3 These rates cannot be summed: some persons have more than one credential.  
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dampens entrepreneurship or innovation (e.g., where new tasks are not undertaken 
because the worker’s license does not address that task). With substantial evidence of 
earnings advantages for licensed workers (reviewed below), this restrictive practice 
argument is often propounded.  
Critically, wages for licensed workers are predicted to be higher regardless of the 
mechanism (in fact, the public goods theory predicts a greater increase in wages than 
does the restrictive practice argument). Indeed, evidence on earnings premiums is 
consistent, with large gains for licensed workers of approximately 15 percent over 
unlicensed workers (Gittleman & Kleiner, 2015; Kleiner & Krueger, 2013; Kleiner & 
Vorotnikov, 2017). Earnings premiums for licensed workers also vary by occupation and, 
modestly, by state (on health care, see Law & Marks, 2017; Stange, 2014; on patterns by 
state, see Kleiner & Vorotnikov, 2017).4 
However, to differentiate between the arguments, the main issue is the direction 
of change in employment. If licensing serves as a restrictive practice, the demand for the 
end product will be unchanged and employment in that occupation will be reduced as 
each worker is paid more. But if licensing improves product quality and consumers are 
willing to pay for that quality, demand may shift outward and employment will be 
increased—and earnings will be increased further (Lowenberg & Tinnin, 1992).5 Thus, 
employment effects are critical for evaluating the optimal degree of licensing.  
Few studies have looked at employment effects. Kleiner (2006) finds negative 
labor supply effects across selected occupations. Law and Marks (2017) find no 
association between licensing and employment of nurses as licenses were tightened over 
time; and, investigating the healthcare market for office-based workers, Stange (2014) 
                                                 
4 Recently, licensing requirements have been changing with more inter-state reciprocity agreements 
whereby one state accepts the right to practice of license-holders from another state and vice versa. By 
increasing labor supply, these agreements should reduce the wage premium. However, an important 
pressure for reciprocity agreements is the growth of teleworking, where professionals provide services both 
in their origin state and outside their own state. Thus, reciprocity allows licensed workers to respond to 
increased demand for services (Chaudry, Robin, Fish, Polk, & Gifford, 2015). For the Nurse Licensing 
Compact, DePasquale and Stange (2014) find that a positive licensing wage premium remains. 
5 The direct evidence on licensing and product quality does not clearly show product quality is higher with 
licensing (DTOEP, CEA, DOL, 2015; on prices for medical services, see Kleiner, Marier, Park, & Wing, 
2016). However, there are few studies; most examine the teaching profession, where licensing rates are 
high, postsecondary education is a strong substitute for a license, and where conditions in unlicensed, 
typically private, schools are quite different from the licensed, typically public, sector.  
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finds some modest negative labor supply effects. However, with demographic changes, 
the health services market has experienced a long-run upward trend in demand. 
Nationally, looking across all occupations, there is limited evidence on labor supply 
effects from licensing. 
A third potential effect of licenses is on intra-occupational wage dispersion. Two 
mechanisms may influence wage dispersion. One mechanism is “skill compression.” By 
mandating that all workers receive similar training and meet a threshold competency, 
skill levels—and hence earnings—should be less variable. Also, given that licenses are 
(minimum) competency standards, earnings gains should be greater for lower-earning 
workers: the licensing requirements force them to upgrade their skills to meet the 
standard. The other mechanism is “service constraint.” By restricting the practices 
licensed workers can perform in their jobs, service prices—and hence earnings—should 
be less variable.  
Again, both arguments predict that licensing will reduce wage dispersion. From a 
restrictive practice argument, the reduction may be prima facie evidence of lower rates of 
intra-occupational entrepreneurship. From a public goods argument, any reduction in 
wage dispersion should be desirable for workers who are risk-averse about acquiring 
occupation-specific skills. However, the evidence on wage dispersion is in fact contrary. 
Based on quantile regression estimates, Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2017, Tables 8A and 
8B) find that licensing increases wage dispersion, with larger earnings gains for those in 
higher wage occupations relative to those in lower wage occupations. Based on estimated 
mean squared errors across income quartiles, Gittleman and Kleiner (2017) also conclude 
that the licensed sector has higher wage dispersion, although the differences are not 
statistically significant. These unexpected findings remain to be explained.  
As well as the direct effect of licensing, an important question is how licensing 
affects the labor market value of college. To our knowledge there has been little 
investigation into the relationship between licensing and postsecondary education. This is 
surprising because many licenses require a college credential, and therefore licensing is 
strongly positively associated with postsecondary attainment and is especially high for 
individuals from community colleges. As reported by Cronen et al. (2017, Table 1), the 
highest rates are for associate degree holders at 25 percent, then bachelor’s degree-
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holders at 23 percent, and then persons with some college at 15 percent. The interaction 
between licensing and college remains to be explored. 
Certainly, the labor market returns to a four-year degree are very high, and a 
series of recent studies have found significant wage returns to community college (Bailey 
& Belfield, 2017b; Jepsen, Troske, & Coomes, 2014; Stevens, Kurlaender, & Grosz, 
2017). But, rather than reflecting increased human capital, these returns might be 
partially or even wholly attributable to omitted variable bias from licensing status. It may 
be the license that is causing earnings gains and not the award itself. Although the two 
are related, a license may require knowledge and skills not obtained in college, and in 
fact, not all licenses require a college education: just under half (43–48 percent) require 
any college degree (Kleiner & Krueger, 2013; Kleiner & Vorotnikov, 2017, Table 4). 
Thus, it is important to investigate whether associate degrees and licenses are 
complements or substitutes. 
Finally, there are important questions about adherence to licensing regulations. 
Within a licensed occupation, some workers may be able to work under “accepted 
practice” rules, or via certification or registration. The proliferation of vocational awards, 
certificates, and certifications may facilitate unlicensed work. Of course, non-compliance 
is a possibility: if licensed work pays well, some workers may (illegally) work in licensed 
occupations even if they do not have a license; if licensed workers are expensive, some 
consumers may hire unlicensed contractors. Finally, as licensing rules are complex and 
vary across states, workers may not know that they need a license or may acquire a 
license even though one is not required. (Non-compliance is the difference between 
having a license and that license being needed as a right to practice; this is not the same 
as the measurement error of licensing). Thus far, there has been little inquiry into how 
many workers comply with the licensing requirements of their occupation.  
With new Current Population Survey (CPS) data on licensing, we are able to 
investigate each of these issues. We begin by looking at compliance and within-
occupation licensing rates—these provide context on how to measure licensing. We then 
look at the labor market impacts of licensing. Initially, we estimate earnings differences; 
we then identify employment differences; and finally, we examine wage dispersion 
issues. For each labor market domain, we focus on the impacts for associate degree-
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holders; this allows us to identify the extent to which licenses and degrees are 
complements or substitutes. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Frequencies 
3.1 Data 
The main dataset is the CPS 2017 Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
(ASEC). Derived as an annual file from the CPS, the ASEC universe is the civilian non-
institutional population based on household sampling.6 In addition to CPS information, 
the ASEC includes detailed labor market information on earnings, hours and weeks 
worked, and labor market participation for over 80,000 working-age persons.7 ASEC also 
includes occupational status using the Standard Occupational Classification at the six-
digit level. 
As of 2017, the ASEC includes three questions on licensing. These questions are: 
(1) Do you have a currently active professional certification or a state or industry license? 
(2) Were any of your certifications or licenses issued by the federal, state, or local 
government? (3) Is your certification required for your job [job from which you are on 
lay-off/job at which you last worked]? Conventionally, as only a government agency can 
convey a legal right, affirmative answers to question (2) are indicative of worker 
licensing. However, in order to be sure that these licenses are work-related, we perform 
all estimates using answers to question (3).8 Hence, we can identify the impact of 
licensing on employment outcomes across a representative sample of the U.S. 
workforce.9 
                                                 
6 The ASEC does not include information on ability. However, omitted variable bias may not be 
significant: Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2017) identify ability bias; Gittelman and Kleiner (2015) do not. 
7 ASEC also includes information on income from self-employment; analysis using this variable yields 
equivalent conclusions to using annual income. 
8 The results are very similar—and the conclusions identical—if we use answers to question (2). Details are 
available from the authors. 
9 These licensing questions have been criticized. They do not allow us to clearly distinguish certification 
from licensing. They only refer to government-issued right to practice; it is unclear what respondents 
declare if they have a license from a private agency. Finally, they only refer to current licenses. See Kleiner 
and Vorotnikov (2017). 
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Separate from the ASEC survey, we collect data on whether a license is needed 
for an occupation within a given state. Records on licensing requirements are merged in 
from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration 
(DOLETA) Career One-Stop services. These licensing requirements are reported per six-
digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code and per state. They are collected 
from web-based and documentary reviews compiled by Labor Market Information Units 
in each state.10 There are 484 six-digit SOC codes and 50 states (plus Washington, DC), 
and so there are thousands of state–occupation “dyads.” We label a license as being 
“needed” if, according to the DOLETA database, workers in that state–occupation dyad 
should have a license.  
An alternative record of licensing is derived from aggregation of the ASEC 
responses. For each state–occupation dyad, we calculate the mean response to question 
(3) above (“Is your certification required for your job?”). When more than 50 percent of 
workers within a state–occupation dyad positively report that a license is required for 
doing their job, it is reasonable to expect that all workers in that dyad should have a 
license. Thus, we label a license as being “expected” based on majority-positive records 
per ASEC dyad.  
We match the direct CPS individual-level responses on licensing to the DOLETA 
and ASEC-aggregate measures of licensing need and expectation. The match is done by 
state–occupation dyad. 
3.2 The Prevalence of Licensing Across the U.S. Workforce 
Table 1 shows the full information on the prevalence of licensing across U.S. 
college-educated workers aged 18-64 based on ASEC data. Exactly one quarter of 
workers indicate they have a license or certification issued by a federal or state agency 
that is required for their job. This incidence accords with prior data from the ATES 
descriptive frequencies in Cronen et al. (2017); see also Gittleman and Kleiner (2017). 
                                                 
10 Licensing information is collated by the National Crosswalk Center into a single database, with states 
submitting license information biennially (see www.careeronestop.org/toolkit/training/find-licenses.aspx). 
Although some (unnamed) states are declared as non-participants, the database includes information from 
every state. For validation, we check the database against alternative compendia of licensing (e.g., 
Carpenter et al., 2012) and, for selected occupations, against occupation-specific national licensing boards 
(Aragon, 2017). These data are also used by Gittelman and Kleiner (2015) for the NLSY samples.  
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Notably, workers with associate degrees are licensed at the highest rates (35 percent), 
slightly above workers with bachelor’s degrees or advanced degrees. Licensing rates vary 
significantly across occupations. For example, three quarters of healthcare practitioners 











































Licensing status can be determined in several ways. If certification and licensing are 
counted jointly, 30 percent of workers have a credential that relates to their “right to practice.” 
The correspondence between licensing and work can be seen using various metrics. Based on 
self-reports in the ASEC, 25 percent of workers have licenses that are “required for their job.” 
Based on the DOLETA data matched to each worker’s state–occupation dyad, 27 percent of 
workers have licenses that are “needed.” Finally, based on ASEC percentage dyads, only 18 
percent of workers are “expected” to have licenses. Although these metrics yield similar rates 
as when using the preferred definition (license issued by a government agency), the overlap 
between them is moderate. Below, we examine non-compliance directly and test the sensitivity 
of our results to alternative measures of licensing. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the discrepancies between whether the worker 
has or should have a license. Unsurprisingly, of those who self-report having a license, 
almost all say it is required. Applying DOLETA dyads, we find that only half of all 
licenses are needed; also, there are equal numbers who have licenses that are not needed 
and who do not have licenses that are needed. The discrepancy for expected licenses is 
substantial. Most of the workers with licenses are expected to have a license. But there is 
a large percentage of license holders for whom a license is not expected. Rates of 
expected licensing are not symmetric: there are many occupations for which it is 
generally agreed that a license is not required, but there are few occupations for which all 
workers are agreed that a license is required (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). As a third 
check, we correlate the statewide averages of individual licensing rates with those 
reported by Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2017), who use a differently worded question about 
licensing. (The pairwise correlations are shown in Figure A2.) The relationship is 
modestly positive, although statewide rates in ASEC are less variable (mostly at 20–25 
percent) than rates from Kleiner and Vorotnikov. Overall, there appear to be many 
occupations for which licensing compliance is open to question. 
As a preliminary investigation, we investigate worker characteristics associated 
with licensing. In Table A1 we report descriptive statistics for the college-educated 
sample. In Table A2 we report coefficients from a logistic regression on the associate 
degree sample with licensing as the dependent variable. These tables show that, looking 
across the college-educated sample, licensees have some distinct characteristics relative 
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to persons without a license. White workers are much more likely to have licenses, as are 
female workers, those working in government jobs, and the self-employed. These 
findings broadly corroborate evidence from prior studies, although the prior studies 
typically find higher licensing rates for male workers.11 Overall, the logistic regression 
shows few statistically significant differences for the associate degree sample: only self-
employment is a strong predictor of licensing. 
Table 2 shows descriptive frequencies for the earnings and employment measures. 
There are large gaps in earnings between license holders and those without licenses. 
Table 2 also shows nontrivial differences by licensing in hours worked, part-time work 




  Does Not Have License    Has License 
  Mean  (S.D.)    Mean  (S.D.) 
Wage pay           
All college‐educated workforce  $58,777  (72,022)    $62,290  (69,688) 
Associate degree  $44,872  (46,173)    $47,383  (43,148) 
Vocational associate degree  $44,875  (48,503)    $45,935  (48,040) 
Academic associate degree  $44,870  (44,580)    $48,833  (37,583) 
Hours per week  40.6  (10.4)    41.7  (11.3) 
Part‐time  0.13      0.12   
Unemployed  0.03      0.02   




We apply OLS estimation to identify the effects of licensing on labor market 
outcomes. We estimate a series of regression equations with j dependent variables: 
earnings, hours worked, employment status, and part-time work status. (All estimates are 
performed separately by gender.) These outcomes depend on a set of covariate controls X 
and college education EDUC at the individual i level, and the licensing status LICENSE 
                                                 
11 See Gittelman and Kleiner (2015); Kleiner and Krueger (2013); Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2017). These 
studies are not restricted to the college-educated population. 
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of the worker.12 The primary version of this last variable is the individual self-reported 
licensing status. Thus, the first specification shows the independent impacts of college 
and licensing: 
 
Yj = f(Xi, EDUCi, LICENSEi) (1) 
We expect the coefficient on licensing to be strongly positive for earnings. To distinguish 
between the public good and restrictive practice arguments, we focus on the effect of 
licensing on labor market participation at the individual worker level. As a validation 
check, we also estimate employment rates by occupation and state.  
Next, to separate out impacts by college attainment, we estimate versions of 
specification (1) for the sample of workers with associate degrees and by subgroup 
according to whether the associate degree is in a vocational or academic field. These 
versions yield information on how licenses affect the returns to college. 
To more clearly identify the relationships between postsecondary education and 
licensing, we estimate an omnibus model with interactions between college attainment 
and licensing: 
 
Yj = f(Xi, EDUCi,LICENSEi) (2) 
 
Equation (2) yields the direct effects of licensing for each education level. In 
particular, we are interested in the effects on labor market outcomes of licenses and 
postsecondary degrees both independently and interacted together. If the education 
coefficients are substantially attenuated for workers who do hold licenses, this suggests 
substantial omitted variable bias in prior estimates of the returns to college. 
Next, we test for the effects of licenses accounting for the possibility of 
noncompliance. We apply state- and occupation-specific dyadic measures from the 
DOLETA data and from the aggregated responses of the individuals in the ASEC 
(LICENSEs_occ1 and LICENSEs_occ2). Initially, we interpret these measures as alternative 
ways to identify licensing across the workforce and estimate versions of equation (1): 
                                                 
12 Some prior studies control for two-digit occupational codes. We do not. These additional controls 
typically do not affect the findings and conclusions (Gittelman & Kleiner, 2015; Kleiner & Krueger, 2013; 




Yj = f(Xi, EDUCi, LICENSEs_occk) k = 1, 2                 (3) 
 
Next, we divide licensing into four groups based on need/expectation and possession 
of a license. Labor market outcomes are predicted to be superior for workers who have 
licenses and for those licenses that are needed/expected. In addition, we treat the dyadic 
licensing measures as exogenous determinants of whether an individual should have a license 
or not.13 We estimate a first-stage equation where licensing status is determined by licensing 
need/expectation and then instrumental variables estimates as per equation (1):  
 
Yj = f(Xi, EDUCi, LICENSEi = LICENSEs_occk) k =1, 2                     (4) 
 
Finally, we examine wage dispersion for license holders. We apply two methods 
that have been used in similar contexts. The first is estimation of the conditional earnings 
differentials between licensed and non-licensed workers by quartile and the 
corresponding differentials in the conditional mean squared errors. Where the mean 
squared errors are inflated, wage dispersion is increased. This method has been applied 
by Gittelman and Kleiner (2015). The second method is quantile regression. This method 
shows how the returns to licensing vary across the earnings distribution (Kleiner & 
Vorotnikov, 2017). Larger coefficients in the lower part of the earnings distribution 
indicate reduced wage dispersion. As with all preceding analyses, we apply both methods 




5.1 Earnings and Employment Effects 
Table 3 shows gains in earnings for different samples of college-educated 
workers. The top panel shows that, across all college-educated workers, a license is 
associated with gain in earnings for 20 percent and 8 percent for female and male 
                                                 
13 The license expected instrument is continuous, based on the probability of affirmative answers per state-
occupation dyad on whether the license is required.  
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workers respectively. These gains are substantial and are comparable to those from an 
associate degree at 12 percent and 11 percent respectively.14 (Returns for persons with 
bachelor’s degrees are substantially higher). The returns to degrees reported in Table 3 
are very close to those reviewed from transcript data across seven state systems in 
Belfield and Bailey (2017c). Importantly, Table 3 shows that associate degrees and 
































                                                 
14 These estimates are close to the full worker sample estimates of Gittelman and Kleiner (2015) of 13 
percent and 9 percent and of Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2017) of 11 percent (pooled gender). 
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The lower panels of Table 3 show that workers with associate degrees have 
significantly higher earnings if they also have a license. The average licensing premium 
is 30 percent for women and 12 percent for men. Notably, the premium is much larger for 
academic associate degrees (at 33 percent and 15 percent) than for vocational associate 
degrees (at 28 percent for female license holders but with no statistically significant 
premium for male license holders).  
To clearly identify the relationship between postsecondary education and 
licensing, Table 4 shows earnings gaps from interactions within an omnibus 
specification, where the omitted category is workers with some college but no degree and 
no license. For persons with some college, having a license is associated with a gain in 
earnings of 18 percent for women and 23 percent for men. For associate degree holders, 
those without licenses gain almost the same as college non-completers with licenses (with 
gains over the omitted category of 9 percent and 13 percent). Hence, we find that a 
worker who obtains a license when in college might consider that equivalent to getting an 
associate degree. Nevertheless, it is still preferable to complete an associate degree: not 
only is the individual more likely to then get a license, but the earnings gains are larger at 
39 percent versus 18 percent for women (for men the gains are identical at 23 percent). 
Estimates by degree field highlight the different effects of licenses. For vocational 
associate degrees, the college advantage is modest unless the worker also has a license. 
For academic associate degrees, the licensing effects are much larger, perhaps because 
the academic degree itself conveys weak signals to employers of a worker’s vocational 
skills. 
Table 5 shows the employment effects of licensing. These results provide a 
discriminatory test between the public goods and restrictive practice arguments. Workers 
with licenses have significantly higher labor market participation. Controlling for college, 
they report more hours of work and lower unemployment. The results for part-time work 
are inconclusive (as only a few workers report part-time status directly). At 1.96 and 1.89 
hours per week for the full college sample, these employment effects are substantively 
large: they exceed the effects of having an associate degree. Again, licenses and associate 
degrees convey employment advantages independently of each other. Indeed, the gains 
from licenses are even greater for persons with associate degrees (at 1.25 and 2.95 hours 
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respectively). As with the results for earnings, the employment effects are stronger for 
licensed workers with academic associate degrees than for those with vocational 
associate degrees.15 
Table 6 shows results from the omnibus specification for hours worked.16 
Workers with both postsecondary education and licenses work more hours than those 
with only postsecondary education. This advantage is 3.56 and 3.46 hours for workers 
with some college, which is slightly above the advantage just from having an associate 
degree. As with our results on earnings, we can infer that obtaining a license might be 
viewed as at least equivalent—and perhaps superior—to completing an associate degree. 
Similarly, though, getting an associate degree with a license yields significant advantages 
(at 3.14 and 3.72 hours respectively). The greater advantage in hours worked for 
academic associate degrees over vocational associate degrees is another consistent 
finding.  
  
                                                 
15 As an alternative measure, unemployment may be aggregated to the local labor market rather than 
measured at the individual worker level. In the few studies that have looked at employment, the measure 
has been aggregated rather than individualized. Pasquale and Stange (2014) use the American Community 
Survey for nursing occupations; Stange (2014) uses a nurse-specific database; and Law and Marks (2017) 
use the decennial Census. To test for labor market effects using aggregated data, we created an occupation–
state dataset using 2016 Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The OES is a semiannual mail survey of employment and wages across 800 occupations 
nationally (but the survey excludes the self-employed, see www.bls.gov/oes/oes_emp.htm#overview). We 
merged these OES data with occupation–state level rates of licensing from the CPS and regressed 
occupation–state employment against licensing rates, controlling for workforce compositions and 
unemployment rates. However, the results were inconsistent across aggregated licensing measures. Using 
the main definition of licensing, employment rates were significantly negatively affected in occupation–
states with high rates of licensing. Based on licensing need, however, employment and licensing were 
strongly positively correlated. (Details available from the authors.)  





  Female    Male 
(1)  (2)    (1)  (2) 
Relative to group “Some college, no license”           
Some college + license  0.169***  0.169***  0.215***  0.215*** 
  [0.028]  [0.028]  [0.024]  [0.024] 
Bachelor’s degree + no license  0.554***  0.554***  0.551***  0.551*** 
  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.015]  [0.015] 
Bachelor’s degree + license  0.709***  0.709***  0.564***  0.564*** 
  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.019]  [0.019] 
Associate degree + no license  0.076***    0.113***   
  [0.021]    [0.019]   
Associate degree + license  0.351***    0.221***   
  [0.022]    [0.025]   
Vocational associate degree + no license    0.018    0.103*** 
    [0.031]    [0.024] 
Vocational associate degree + license    0.282***    0.185*** 
    [0.030]    [0.032] 
Academic associate degree + no license    0.110***    0.121*** 
    [0.024]    [0.023] 
Academic associate degree + license    0.414***    0.264*** 
    [0.026]    [0.035] 
R‐squared  0.132  0.132  0.200  0.201 










per Week    Unemployment    Part‐Time Status 
Female  Male    Female  Male    Female  Male 
College‐educated                 
Associate degree  0.52*  0.80**  ‐0.02  ‐0.338***  ‐0.148***  ‐0.292*** 
  [0.29]  [0.31]  [0.112]  [0.114]  [0.049]  [0.079] 
Bachelor’s degree  2.06***  1.44***  ‐0.225**  ‐0.489***  ‐0.468***  ‐0.545*** 
  [0.24]  [0.24]  [0.094]  [0.090]  [0.041]  [0.063] 
License  1.96***  1.89***  ‐1.018***  ‐0.523***  ‐0.140***  ‐0.274*** 
  [0.21]  [0.25]  [0.126]  [0.122]  [0.040]  [0.077] 
R‐squared  0.018  0.026         
Observations  25,106  23,244    24,640  22,873    25,106  23,244 
Associate degree                 
License  1.25***  2.95***  ‐0.504**  ‐0.650**  ‐0.046  0.032 
  [0.45]  [0.58]  [0.205]  [0.275]  [0.078]  [0.150] 
R‐squared  0.021  0.025         
Observations  4,712  4,016    4,672  3,950    4,712  4,016 
Vocational associate degree                 
License  2.16***  1.63*  ‐0.705**  ‐0.113  ‐0.204*  0.01 
  [0.69]  [0.85]  [0.357]  [0.331]  [0.121]  [0.207] 
R‐squared  0.018  0.021         
Observations  1,863  1,886    1,848  1,854    1,863  1,863 
Academic associate degree                 
License  2.85***  4.05***  ‐1.125***  ‐1.131**  ‐0.236**  ‐0.545** 
  [0.60]  [0.80]  [0.343]  [0.532]  [0.111]  [0.271] 
R‐squared  0.028  0.035             










  Female    Male 
  (1)  (2)    (1)  (2) 
Relative to group “Some college, no license”         
Some college + license  3.56***  3.56***  3.46***  3.46*** 
  [0.51]  [0.51]  [0.53]  [0.53] 
Bachelor’s degree + no license  2.51***  2.51***  1.96***  1.96*** 
  [0.26]  [0.26]  [0.27]  [0.27] 
Bachelor’s degree + license  3.80***  3.80***  2.79***  2.79*** 
  [0.31]  [0.31]  [0.37]  [0.37] 
Associate degree + no license  0.57*    0.82**   
  [0.34]    [0.35]   
Associate degree + license  3.14***    3.72***   
  [0.42]    [0.557]   
Vocational associate degree + no license    0.76    0.81* 
    [0.47]    [0.47] 
Vocational associate degree + license    2.82***    2.58*** 
    [0.58]    [0.76] 
Academic associate degree + no license    0.45    0.84** 
    [0.40]    [0.42] 
Academic associate degree + license    3.42***    5.05*** 
    [0.53]    [0.75] 
R‐squared  0.021  0.021  0.028  0.028 







5.2 Compliance With Licensing Requirements 
The descriptive frequencies reported above highlight ambiguity over the 
importance of licenses for each occupational category. Here we estimate earnings and 
employment effects across alternative licensing metrics for all college-educated workers 
and workers with associate degrees. 
Table 7 shows the earnings effects of licensing. The upper panel is based on 
whether a license is needed (i.e., whether the DOLETA database reports a license is 
needed). The lower panel is based on whether a license is expected (i.e., whether a 
majority of ASEC respondents in that dyad report a license being required). The 
conclusions are consistent across licensing metrics and across the two samples. 
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Model A shows the gains from working in a state–occupation where a license is 
needed/expected, regardless of whether the worker has a license. This estimation 
corresponds to earlier studies where licensing is imputed. As shown, the effects of a 
license being needed/expected are substantial and are similar to the gains from having a 
license. However, the gains vary depending on the correspondence between working in 
the state–occupation where a license is needed/expected and the worker actually having 
that license. As given in Model B, having a license that is needed/expected is associated 
with very large earnings gains of 42 percent and 15 percent for associate degree holders 
(and 34 percent and 17 percent respectively for the college-educated sample).  
Nevertheless, there are still earnings gains from having a license that is not 
needed. Therefore, licenses convey earnings gains even when there is no overt restrictive 
practice of occupation-wide licensing. As well, there are only small—but still 
significant—gains for workers who are not licensed but work in dyads where licenses are 
needed (as found by Gittelman & Kleiner, 2015). This last group may be either non-
compliers or they may be performing specific tasks which are ancillary to the occupation 
and which do not need a license. These results for needing a license are the same for 
persons with associate degrees as for across the college population, again with the 
consistent caveat that earnings gaps for male workers are significantly attenuated.  
Finally, Model C shows results where the worker’s license is instrumented using 
whether a license is needed/expected. For all the instrumental variable estimates across 
the samples, the earnings benefits from licensing are substantially higher than those 
reported in Table 3. (Again, as shown by the results from the endogeneity tests, the 
licensing effects are more weakly identified for male workers.) These larger gains from 
the instrumental variables specification are also suggestive of both an inward supply shift 






  Associate Degree Holders    All College‐Educated Workers 
  Female  Male    Female  Male 
License needed (DOLETA)           
Model A           
License Needed  0.251***  0.067**  0.140***  0.051*** 
  [0.026]  [0.030]  [0.012]  [0.013] 
Model B         
Licensed + needed  0.356***  0.126***  0.312***  0.145*** 
  [0.029]  [0.040]  [0.015]  [0.019] 
Licensed + not needed  0.107**  0.046  0.116***  0.101*** 
  [0.043]  [0.041]  [0.018]  [0.017] 
Not licensed + needed  0.052  0.056*  0.081***  0.045*** 
  [0.034]  [0.031]  [0.017]  [0.015] 
Model C         
License (IV is needed)  0.594***  0.333**  0.400***  0.241*** 
  [0.062]  [0.151]  [0.035]  [0.061] 
Endogeneity test F(1, N‐K)  33.3  2.4  44.5  7.3 
Adjusted R‐squared 1st stage  0.183  0.049  0.190  0.092 
License expected (ASEC)         
Model A         
License expected  0.427***  0.204***  0.244***  0.088*** 
  [0.035]  [0.043]  [0.017]  [0.021] 
Model B         
Licensed + expected  0.319***  0.101***  0.260***  0.054*** 
  [0.027]  [0.038]  [0.014]  [0.018] 
Licensed + not expected  0.080  0.097*  ‐0.002  ‐0.051 
  [0.062]  [0.057]  [0.027]  [0.034] 
Not licensed + expected  0.046  0.062*  0.078***  0.069*** 
Model C         
License expected IV  0.409***  0.202***  0.243***  0.089*** 
  [0.033]  [0.042]  [0.017]  [0.021] 
Endogeneity test F(1, N‐K)  34.5  8.6  21.0  0.2 
Adjusted R‐squared 1st stage  0.537  0.384  0.516  0.410 








For hours worked, Table 8 reports results across the different licensing 
requirements. (Results for unemployment and part-time status are similar in sign, but few 
coefficients are statistically significant). The same models A–C are estimated as per 
Table 7. There is a strong association between hours worked and needing/expecting a 
license for female workers; the results for male workers are inconsistent, with no effect 
from working in a dyad where a license is needed. As with earnings, there are very strong 
and consistent effects for workers in dyads where a license is needed/expected and the 
individual worker has a license. These workers report between one and three hours more 
work per week. By contrast, there are no clear effects for licensed workers in dyads 
where a license is not needed/expected. Interestingly, there are some positive 
employment effects for workers who are unlicensed but work in dyads where a license is 
needed/expected. Finally, applying either instrumental variable, we see that licenses are 






  Associate Degree Holders    All College‐Educated Workers 
  Female  Male    Female  Male 
License needed (DOLETA)         
Model A         
License needed  0.86*  0.01  0.81***  ‐0.01 
  [0.47]  [0.60]  [0.21]  [0.24] 
Model B         
Licensed + needed  2.157***  1.798**  2.321***  1.579*** 
  [0.564]  [0.916]  [0.260]  [0.362] 
Licensed + not needed  0.433  ‐0.079  0.498*  ‐0.147 
  [0.715]  [0.743]  [0.281]  [0.290] 
Not Licensed + needed  3.306***  3.221***  2.239***  2.145*** 
  [0.626]  [0.701]  [0.309]  [0.324] 
Model C         
License needed IV  2.05*  0.04  2.32***  ‐0.04 
  [1.11]  [3.04]  [0.59]  [1.12] 
Endogeneity test F(1, N‐K)  0.2  0.8  0.42  3.0 
Adjusted R‐squared 1st stage  0.181  0.049  0.189  0.091 
 
License expected (ASEC)         
Model A         
License expected  1.88***  2.53**  1.16***  1.59*** 
  [0.64]  [0.99]  [0.31]  [0.40] 
Model B         
Licensed + expected  1.13**  2.78***  1.01***  1.36*** 
  [0.53]  [0.95]  [0.25]  [0.37] 
Licensed + not expected  ‐1.33  ‐1.13  ‐0.84*  ‐1.71*** 
  [1.08]  [1.59]  [0.44]  [0.63] 
Not licensed + expected  1.17*  2.97***  1.18***  1.67*** 
  [0.66]  [0.68]  [0.31]  [0.31] 
Model C         
License expected IV  1.80***  2.51***  1.16***  1.59*** 
  [0.62]  [0.98]  [0.30]  [0.40] 
Endogeneity test F(1, N‐K)  2.84  0.12  12.5  0.85 
Adjusted R‐squared 1st stage  0.536  0.382  0.515  0.406 







5.3 Earnings Dispersion 
Licensing should reduce wage dispersion either by compressing skills or 
constraining services.17 However, prior evidence has found increased wage dispersion. 
We calculate wage dispersion for two samples (college-educated and associate degrees 
only) split by gender.  
Tables 9 and 10 show the effect on wage dispersion based on the method in Card 
(1996). For each quartile of the female college-educated sample, predicted wages of 
licensed workers exceed those of unlicensed workers, and the gaps are statistically 
significant; across the quartiles for male workers, the gaps are slightly smaller and not 
always positive, but on average the gap is significant. However, the mean squared error is 
substantially smaller for all college-educated workers with licenses: these results indicate 
that licensing reduces wage dispersion across the distribution of earnings. Looking at the 
associate degree sample, the earnings gaps are not statistically significant per quartile. 
Nevertheless, the mean squared error is much smaller, which is further evidence of the 
effect of licensing on wage dispersion.   
                                                 
17 As an illustration (see Figure A2), we draw a scatterplot of the returns to licensing across states; we also 
correlate these returns with those from Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2017). The returns per state are clustered 
around 20–25 percent, with only a few outliers; estimates from Kleiner and Vorotnikov exhibit more 
variation. Also, as shown in Figure A3, there is no clear association between the proportion licensed in 






Sample   Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4 
Female           
Conditional mean ln(earnings)           
No license NL  9.9835  10.3059  10.5674  10.8470  10.3930 
Licensed L  10.0086   10.3239  10.5846  10.8508  10.5056 
Difference L–NL  0.0251  0.0180  0.0172  0.0038  0.1126 
p‐value  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Conditional mean squared error           
No license NL  0.9968  0.8059  0.8552  0.8966  0.8900 
Licensed L  0.6989  0.6526  0.6330  0.5683  0.6287 
Difference L–NL  ‐0.2979  ‐0.1533  ‐0.2222  ‐0.3282  ‐0.2613 
p‐value  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
Observations  5,966  6,072  6,143  6,160  24,341 
 
Male           
Conditional mean ln(earnings)           
No license NL  10.3128  10.7504  11.0471  11.3520  10.8447 
Licensed L  10.3657  10.7559  11.0476  11.3472  10.9359 
Difference L–NL  0.0529  0.0055  0.0005  ‐0.0047  0.0912 
p‐value  ***  **  NS  **  *** 
Conditional mean squared error           
No license NL  0.8695  0.6349  0.6058  0.6343  0.6907 
Licensed L  0.6419  0.4767  0.4757  0.6069  0.5442 
Difference L–NL  ‐0.2276  ‐0.1582  ‐0.1301  ‐0.0274  ‐0.1465 
p‐value  **  **  ***  NS  *** 












Sample   Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4 
Female           
Conditional mean ln(earnings)           
No license NL  9.9228  10.2334  10.3676  10.4608  10.2491 
Licensed L  9.9171  10.2240  10.3702  10.4630  10.2402 
Difference L–NL  ‐0.0056  ‐0.0094  ‐0.0026  0.0022  ‐0.0088 
p‐value  NS  **  NS  NS  NS 
Conditional mean squared error           
No license NL  0.9504  0.8495  0.7949  0.7090  0.8234 
Licensed L  0.5663  0.6350  0.6268  0.4010  0.5598 
Difference L–NL  ‐0.3840  ‐0.2146  ‐0.1680  ‐0.3080  ‐0.2636 
p‐value  **  *  **  ***  *** 
Observations  1,178  1,178  1,175  1,181  4,712 
           
Male           
Conditional mean ln(earnings)           
No license NL  10.3129  10.6476  10.8207  10.9882  10.6824 
Licensed L  10.3276  10.6538  10.8157  10.9962  10.7215 
Difference L–NL  0.0147  0.0062  ‐0.0050  0.0080  0.0391 
p‐value  NS  **  NS  **  *** 
Conditional mean squared error           
No license NL  1.0300  0.5190  0.5671  0.3421  0.6211 
Licensed L  0.7868  0.3931  0.5421  0.3589  0.5071 
Difference L–NL  ‐0.2432  ‐0.0250  ‐0.0250  0.0168  ‐0.114 
p‐value  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS 










Figures 1–4 show quantile regression estimates of earnings (as per specifications 
in Table 3). The dotted line is the median estimated returns from licensing; the unbroken 
line (with confidence intervals shaded) shows the estimated returns across the distribution 
of earnings. The overall pattern affirms the conclusion that licensing reduces earnings 
dispersion. Across Figures 1–4, there is a clear downward slope as we move up the 
earnings distribution: the gains from licensing are greater for lower earnings workers. 
The effect is especially strong for female workers and extends across the full distribution 
of earnings such that licensing has no statistically significant effect for the very highest 
percentiles of workers. For male workers, the patterns are less precise as shown by the 
broad confidence intervals. 
This finding is in contrast with findings of greater wage dispersion in prior studies 
by Gittleman and Kleiner (2015) and Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2017). The sample sizes 
for these studies differ from the CPS data. Also, these studies are not focused on the 
college-educated workforce and do not report separate results by gender. Finally, Kleiner 


















Growing interest in licensing is a response to a series of recent labor market 
trends. First, as the workforce has become dominated by workers with postsecondary 
education, workers are accumulating more and varied signals of their productivity—
getting a license is one of these signals. Hence, rates of licensing have increased over 
recent decades. Second, there is a renewed emphasis on apprenticeships and competency-
based education—workers can use licenses to establish these competencies. Third, the 
economy is continuing to move toward trade in services—licenses can play an important 
role in establishing service quality. Finally, completing college is taking longer and 
becoming ever more expensive—workers may attempt to bypass this commitment of 
time and money by obtaining a competency-based license that demonstrates degree-level 
skills. Hence, licenses are now common and may grow in prevalence over time if the 
price of college keeps increasing. 
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Our analysis finds that licensing conveys significant benefits to workers in terms 
of higher earnings and greater labor market participation. At the aggregate level, 
licensing is associated with reduced wage dispersion. Although the effects are stronger 
for female workers, they extend across all college-educated samples. Together, these 
findings—especially with respect to labor market participation—point toward licensing 
as a solution to a public goods theory of market failure due to imperfect information 
rather than as a restrictive practice. 
Importantly, licensing does not undercut the economic value of a college degree. 
Having a license only trivially reduces the returns to college: these returns are only 2–3 
percentage points lower when we control for licensing. This finding remains to be 
explained: one possibility is that the degree generates long-term human capital across all 
work activities, whereas the license reflects worker competency at a specific set of tasks. 
Indeed, there is a clear pinnacle in returns: workers with degrees and licenses report the 
best labor market outcomes—both in terms of earnings and labor market participation. 
Below this, licenses and associate degrees appear to be approximately equivalent in their 
effects on labor market outcomes. We therefore speculate that licensing opportunities 
may in part explain high dropout rates from community colleges. Moreover, licensing 
may be preferable to obtaining a certificate, a certification, or stacked credentials. These 
awards convey weak-to-modest effects on earnings, and any advantages they do convey 
appear to be short-lived. In conclusion, there is some support for an optimistic 
interpretation of licensing: even as a license may serve as a potential substitute for 
certificates and certification, it appears to complement degree attainment by providing 
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White  0.1316  0.1669   [0.1273]  [0.1539] 
African American  ‐0.0044  ‐0.3279*   [0.1537]  [0.1960] 
Hispanic  ‐0.0459  ‐0.1503   [0.1380]  [0.1686] 
Experience  0.0094  0.0061   [0.0105]  [0.0131] 
Experience‐squared  ‐0.0005*  ‐0.0002   [0.0002]  [0.0003] 
Married  0.0189  0.2353***   [0.0656]  [0.0853] 
U.S. born  0.0931  0.037   [0.1071]  [0.1296] 
Union  0.4538  0.376   [0.3217]  [0.2620] 
Sector: Government  ‐0.1179  0.5746***   [0.0920]  [0.1016] 
Sector: Self‐employed  0.3197***  0.2444**   [0.1148]  [0.1164] 
Observations  4,708  4,016 
Note. Source: ASEC 2017. Ages 18–64, associate degree sample only. Unweighted estimation. Logit estimation. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable: has a license. Specification also includes controls for region (3).  
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. 
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Figure A1 
Licensing Rates by Occupation‐State Dyad (ASEC Reports)  
 
 
Figure A2 
Comparison of State Average Licensing Rates  
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Figure A3 
Comparison of State Average Licensing Earnings Premiums 
 
 
Figure A4 
Comparison of State Average Licensing Earnings Gains and Licensing Rates 
